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LEFT-RIGHT PERCEPTIONS, PARTISAN 
PREFERENCES, ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION, 
AND PARTISAN CHOICE IN FRANCE 
Roy Pierce 
An analysis based on survey data shows that electoral participation at the second ballot in 
France can be accounted for by partisan preferences but not by left-right perceptions of 
party locations. This finding runs counter to the work of Rosenthal and Sen (1973), who 
validated a spatial model of participation at the second ballot employing left-right percep- 
tions and partisan preferences interchangeably. Because they use aggregate data, Rosenthal 
and Sen (1973) are restricted in two ways that, operating interactively, lead them to an 
unwarranted conclusion concerning the power of left-right perceptions. Later work by 
Rosenthal and Sen (1977) indicating that left-right perceptions can account for shifts in 
partisan choice between the two ballots by voters who have decided to participate is con- 
firmed, but partisan preferences account even better for second-ballot choioes. Left-right 
perceptions and partisan sympathies are related, but discrete partisan attitudes are a more 
powerful factor than left-right perceptions in French second-ballot electoral behavior. 
The  historical vitali ty of left-right terminology and the broad extent to 
which it permeates  political discourse in more than  a few political cultures 
have  suggested tha t  the left-right dimension may  be a powerful  tool for the 
analysis of political behavior.  Since the publicat ion of Downs '  seminal work 
(1957), there has been a surge of scholarly interest in exploring the extent to 
which  the left-right dimension underlies the electorate's orientations to- 
wa rd  the surrounding political world (Deutsch, Lindon,  and Weill, 1966; 
Laponce ,  1970a, 1970b, 1972; Barnes, 1971; Klingemann,  1972; Rosenthal 
and Sen, 1973, 1977; Sani, 1974; Converse, 1975; Inglehar t  and Klinge- 
mann ,  1976). Yet the behavioral  impac t  of left-right perceptions compared  
wi th  tha t  of discrete part isan a t tachments  has not been investigated. Ingle- 
har t  and  Kl ingemann (1976) have  suggested that  the left-right dimension 
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may serve as a surrogate for party identification in countries such as France, 
which has an historically unstable multiparty system, where left-right vo- 
eabulary is prominent (Chariot, 1975), and where partisan attachments are 
typieally weak (Converse and Dupeux, 1966), but they do not directly test 
the proposition. 
This article will show that left-right perceptions are not as important a 
factor as partisan preferences in French political behavior. Our point of 
departure will be a critique of the work of Rosenthal and Sen (1973, 1977), 
whieh more than any other suggests that French electoral behavior is deter- 
mined by left-right perceptions at least as much as it is by partisan prefer- 
enees. In a pioneering article, Rosenthal and Sen (1973) tested several spa- 
tial and nonspatial models of electoral participation at the second ballot in 
France by analyzing, on the basis of aggregate data at the district level, 
variations in abstentions and spoiled ballots between the two ballots of the 
elections of 1958, 1962, 1967, and 1968.1 The most successful model they 
tested was a nonspatial model that they call the heuristic model, and which 
is based on the number of candidates running in any given district at the 
second ballot and the tightness of the competition between the two front- 
runners at the first ballot. ~ Less successful, but still generally satisfactory, 
was a spatial model that Rosenthal and Sen refer to as the alienation model, 
as it derives from the Davis, Hinieh, and Ordeshook (1970) notion of the 
relationship between alienation and electoral participation, 
Rosenthal and Sen operationalize the alienation model with partisan 
preferences and locations along the left-right dimension interehangeably. 
Sometimes the model produces better results when distance is interpreted in 
preference terms, and sometimes when distance is measured in terms of 
left-right locations, but the differences in outcomes are not great. Both 
measures produce satisfactory results; neither is systematically superior to 
the other. However, whether spatial or nonspatial, the Rosenthal-Sen 
models tend only to account for spoiled ballots, as opposed to valid votes; 
they account less well for abstentions, which Rosenthal and Sen treat as a 
long-term problem. 
In a later work, Rosenthal and Sen (1977) find that once French voters 
decide to cast a valid ballot at the second round of voting, their partisan 
choices can be accounted for by left-right perceptions. They do not, how- 
ever, test to determine whether partisan preferences ean also account for 
those choices as well as or better than left-right perceptions do. 
By a different method than that employed by Rosenthal and Sen, we have 
also sought to account for French participation and choice at the second 
ballot in forced-choice situations. Contrary to Rosenthal and Sen (1973), we 
find that while partisan preferences account for electoral participation, 
left-right perceptions do not. We can also account for abstentions, as well as 
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for spoiled ballots. On the other hand, like Rosenthal and Sen in their later 
work (1977), we find that left-right perceptions can account for partisan 
choice (as opposed to electoral participation). However, we find that parti- 
san preferences account for partisan choice even better than left-right per- 
ceptions do. Partisan preferences are a more powerful factor than left-right 
perceptions of party locations in French second-ballot electoral behavior. 
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION AND LEFT-RIGHT PERCEPTIONS 
The data for our analysis come from a survey of 2,046 respondents shortly 
after the French legislative elections of 1967. In the first stage of the design, 
a sample of 86 electoral districts was drawn, at rates proportional to popula- 
tion size, to represent the 467 districts of continental France. Within each of 
these sample districts, samples of voters were drawn randomly from the 
electoral registers. 
Measures of left-right distances between the voters and the parties were 
obtained early in the interviews. The respondents were asked where they 
would locate the 10 main parties of the period on a t00-point scale that 
ranged from "extreme left" at i to "extreme right" at 100. Specifically, they 
were first asked (before the interviewer had mentioned the names of any 
parties) to list all the parties they could think of, and a left-right rating of 
each party mentioned by the respondent was elicited. Then, the interviewer 
handed the respondent a list containing the names of all 10 parties, and 
asked whether the respondent recognized any of the parties he or she had not 
already mentioned. For each additional party eited by the respondent, a 
left-right location was also obtained. Accordingly, left-right locations were 
obtained from each respondent for every party which the respondent either 
cited spontaneously or recalled when reminded of its existence. Lastly, the 
respondents were asked where they would place themselves on the same 
left-right scale. The distances on the left-right scale between the respon- 
dent's own self-location and the location that the respondent assigned to 
each of the parties that he or she recalled either spontaneously or after 
prompting were then computed. 
First-ballot voters who cannot repeat their partisan choices at the second 
ballot divide three ways: some vote for another candidate, some spoil their 
ballots, and some abstain. For each of those three groups, we generated the 
mean left-right distance between the voters and their first-ballot partisan 
choices, the mean left-right distance between the voters and the closest 
parties that were available to them at the second ballot, and the mean 
distance between those two mean distances. The resulting pattern does not 
make each group's electoral behavior intelligible in left-right terms. Indeed, 
the third of the mean distances just referred to is smallest for the voters who 
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spoiled their ballots, the group for which one would expect it to be the 
greatest. 
Why do Rosenthal and Sen (1973) get a contrary result? The reason is that 
their use of aggregate data imposes restrictions upon them that lead, in this 
instance, to an unwarranted conclusion. Rosenthal and Sen work with the 
actual electoral returns, for each district studied, at the first and second 
ballots. They cannot separate the people who could repeat their first-ballot 
vote at the second ballot from those who could not, and they cannot sepa- 
rate the people who abstained or spoiled their ballots at both the first and 
second ballots from those who did so only at the second ballot. Moreover, in 
assigning left-right locations to the voters and the parties, Rosenthal and Sen 
must assume that all the voters place all the candidates of the same party in 
the same location, and they must attribute to all the voters for a given party 
the same position that that party occupies. Thus they cannot capture the 
idiosyncratic features of the voters' left-right perceptions. Neither of these 
restrictions alone accounts for the divergence between the Rosenthal-Sen 
(1973) findings and our own, but both of the restrictions, taken together and 
in a highly interactive sense, do account for the difference in results. 
This is shown in Table 1, which contains our negative findings concerning 
the power of left-right perceptions among first-ballot voters who cannot 
repeat their partisan choice (upper left), 3 as well as the results of the same 
form of analysis, first, for the same subset of voters but assuming that they 
all perceived the location of each party uniformly and placed themselves at 
the left-right location occupied by the party for which they voted at the first 
ballot (upper right); second, employing idiosyncratic left-right loeations, 
for all persons who voted at the first ballot (lower left); and last, including 
all persons who voted at the first ballot and employing uniform left-right 
partisan locations (lower right). The right side contains only a single 
column, as opposed to the left side, which contains three columns, because 
the assumption that all voters occupy the same left right location that is 
occupied by the party they vote for means that there is always zero distance 
between those two locations. 
Both the upper right and the lower left portions of Table 1 show a slight 
improvement over our original result, but in neither case is it sufficient to 
justify claiming that perceptions of left-right distances account for second- 
ballot participation. However, the lower right portion, which incorporates 
both of the ways in which the Rosenthal-Sen (1973) analysis differs from 
ours, produces good results. There is a sharp distinction between the voters 
and the spoilers, and the abstainers fall between the voters and the spoilers, 
which is what they should do. 
Two different sets of forces are at work when we build the Rosenthal-Sen 
(1973) restrictions into our analysis. First, when one includes all the first- 
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ballot voters instead of working only with those unable to repeat their 
partisan choice, about 80 percent of the second ballot voters are compara- 
tively satisfied voters who are merely repeating a vote for their preferred 
party, which one would normally expect to be closest to them. At the same 
time, the group of ballot-spoilers is no larger than it is when one works only 
with the subset of voters in forced-choice situations. Literally everyone in 
our 1967 sample who reported having spoiled his ballot at the second round 
of voting was a first-ballot voter who could not repeat his partisan choice at 
the second ballot. Thus the contrast between voters and spoilers is sharp- 
ened. 
Second, when one assumes that the location of each voter on the left-right 
dimension is that of his first-ballot partisan choice, the distance between a 
voter and his preferred party is zero, the absolute minimum. When one 
assumes that the location of each party is perceived identically by all the 
voters, the distance between the voter (or his first-ballot choice) and each 
other party in the spectrum is optimized. This does not necessary maximize 
the distance between a voter and the parties for which he does not vote; 
indeed cases are conceivable where it minimizes that distance. But it does 
assume that the dispersion of perceived locations around the mean for each 
party is symmetrical, and we know that that is not a general rule (Converse, 
1975). 
The joint effect of these forces operating simultaneously is to support the 
notion that left-right perceptions account for electoral participation at the 
second ballot. We get satisfactory results when we apply the same restric- 
tions to our data that apply to Rosenthal and Sen (1973). Those restrictions, 
however, depart from the empirical reality, which our original test with 
individual-level data captures. That more realistic test indicates that left- 
right perceptions do not adequately explain electoral participation at the 
second ballot. 
ABSTENTIONS 
The models that Rosenthal and Sen (1973) find satisfactory for explaining 
electoral participation account better for spoiled ballots than for absten- 
tions, which they regard as a long-term problem. Up to a point, Rosenthal 
and Sen are correct; most abstentions are caused by long-term forces, nota- 
b l y - i n  our view--those contributing to low levels of political involvement. 
But some second-ballot abstainers are motivated by the same short-term 
situational forces that account for the behavior of the second-ballot spoilers. 
These are the deliberate abstainers, whom we estimate constitute about half 
of the abstainers among first-ballot voters in forced-choice situations at the 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































because they cannot be isolated from the other abstainers that also populate 
an aggregate data base. They can, however, be isolated within a survey data 
base. 
There are two other types of second-ballot abstainer in addition to the 
deliberate abstainer: the chronic abstainer and the random abstainer. 
Chronic abstainers are second-ballot abstainers who also abstained at the 
first ballot. According to our sample estimate, almost 45 percent of the 
second ballot abstainers had not voted at the first ballot either. These people 
cannot be excluded from aggregate data but they can be excluded from 
survey data. 
Random abstainers are first-ballot voters who abstained at the second 
ballot for reasons other than those of the deliberate abstainers. They are a 
heterogeneous group, including people ranging from politically involved 
persons who intended to vote but were prevented from doing so by illness, 
accident, unexpected travel, or the like, to comparatively uninvolved voters 
whose participation at the first ballot was as random as their abstention at 
the second. According to our sample estimates, about 6 percent of the 
first-ballot voters who could repeat their partisan choice at the second ballot 
abstained, and we can reasonably expect the same proportion of first-ballot 
voters who could not repeat their first-ballot choice at the second ballot also 
to abstain. Inasmuch as our estimates indicate that somewhat more than 11 
percent of the forced-choice electorate abstained at the second ballot, about 
half of the abstentions were random and the other half deliberate. 
We sorted the deliberate abstainers from the random abstainers within 
the forced-choice subset of our 1967 sample on the basis of replies to an 
open-ended question asking abstainers why they did not vote. Table 2 re- 
ports the frequencies of the responses given both by first-ballot voters who 
could have repeated their first-ballot partisan choice at the second ballot 
and by first-ballot voters who could not have done so. 
In separating the deliberate abstainers from the random abstainers, we 
counted as deliberate abstainers only those respondents who told us that 
they" did not vote because no candidate suited them. We took all the other 
abstainers within the group to be random abstainers. There may be deliber- 
ate abstainers among the respondents who said they did not vote because the 
election was decided beforehand, but this response is not sufficiently unam- 
biguous to warrant including it as an indicator. It implies a deliberate 
abstention, but not necessarily because of the limited choice of candidates at 
the second ballot. 
This sorting of abstainers has the disadvantage of dividing them in a ratio 
of about one-third deliberate abstainers to two-thirds random abstainers, 
when the overall estimate of that ratio which we reported above is closer to 
50:50, But the sorting keeps our group of deliberate abstainers as pure as 
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TABLE 2. First-Ballot Voters' Professed Reasons for Abstaining at the Second Ballot, 
France, 1967 (%). 
Voters Who Could 
Repeat Their 
First-Ballot Choice 
Voters Who Could 
Not Repeat Their 
First-Ballot Choice 
Prevented from going to 
the polls (Sickness, 
Injury, Absence, etc.) 51.8% 49.3% 
Lack of interest 7.5 - -  
No suitable candidate 2.0 32.5 
Election decided in 
advance 1.4 6.8 
Claimed there was no 
second ballot 32.7 11.4 
Other reasons 3.0 - -  
Don't know 1.6 --  
100.0 100.0 
(N=49,5) (N=28.0) 
possible, and if we have included some deliberate abstainers in the group of 
random abstainers, little harm is done as long as the two test groups display 
at t i tudinal  differences, for the presence of some deliberate abstainers 
among the random abstainers should contr ibute toward narrowing the dif- 
ferences between the two test groups. 
The  similarity between the attitudes of the spoilers and the deliberate 
abstainers, and the difference between the attitudes of the deliberate ab- 
stainers and the random abstainers, are apparent  when we isolate those 
three groups in the test that  indicates that  partisan preferences account for 
part ic ipat ion at the second ballot (see Table 3). 4 
The  relative partisan preferences of the respondents at our 1967 survey 
were  determined on the basis of a sympathy scale, or what  is sometimes 
called a "feelings thermometer ."  The respondents were shown a vertical 
scale with nine graduated markings ranging from 0 to 100; each mark was 
labeled with a term designating an appropriate degree of sympathy or 
hostility. The  respondents were read a list of political objects, including the 
names of the main political parties, and they were asked to indicate what  
grade on the sympathy scale they would give to each object. In addition, 
they were told by the interviewers that a grade of 100 meant  that they had a 
lot of sympathy  for the group, that  zero meant  that  they did not like it at all, 
and that  a grade of 50 meant  either that  they were neither for nor against it 
or that  they did not know much about it. ~ 
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feelings toward their first-ballot partisan choices, but while the voters also 
had positive feelings toward the party available at the second ballot that 
they preferred the most, and therefore had an incentive to vote, that was not 
the case for the spoilers or the deliberate abstainers. In fact, for those two 
groups, the term "most-preferred" available party is a misnomer; "least-dis- 
liked" would be more appropriate, as in both eases the relevant sympathy 
scores are well below the midpoint of 50. The difference in sympathy be- 
tween their first-ballot choice and the least disliked party available at the 
second ballot is even larger for the deliberate abstainers (32.5 points) than it 
is for the spoilers (28.5 points) and, in both cases, is some three times as large 
as it is for the people who chose to cast a valid ballotd The deliberate 
abstainers resemble the spoilers; neither group had an incentive to vote at 
the second ballot. 7 
The behavior of the random abstainers is quite different from that of any 
other category. They abstained at the second ballot when they felt as mueh 
sympathy for at least one available party as they felt for the party they had 
voted for at the first ballot. The inescapable conclusion is that partisan 
preferences do not account for random abstentions. It is not our purpose 
here to examine electoral participation in terms of factors other than parti- 
san preferences and left-right perceptions, but to the extent that random 
abstentions may be accounted for by any other single factor, that factor 
would appear to be political involvement, s 
We have, therefore, accounted for deliberate abstentions as well as for 
spoiled ballots. Rosenthal and Sen cannot aeeount for deliberate abstentions 
because of the limitations of aggregate data. Their second-ballot abstainers 
are heavily populated with chronic abstainers and random abstainers, and 
the deliberate abstainers are submerged within the larger group. 
By the same logic one might ask why Rosenthal and Sen can account for 
spoiled ballots. After all, they cannot disaggregate the people who spoiled 
their ballot papers at the first ballot but not at the second, those who spoiled 
their ballot papers at both ballots, and those who spoiled them at the second 
ballot but not at the first. They cannot distinguish among these different 
groups of ballot spoilers any more than they can among the various groups 
of abstainers. Yet some of the models they test, including the spatial model, 
are sensitive to spoiled ballots even if they are not sensitive to abstentions. 
The reason is almost certainly that the proportion of spoiled ballots typi- 
cally increases sharply between the first and the second ballots, whereas the 
proportion of abstentions does not. On the basis of the official returns for the 
76 districts in our sample where there were two ballots in 1967, 2.1 percent 
of the first-ballot voters spoiled their ballots, while 3.5 percent of the sec- 
ond-ballot voters did so. That is an increase of two-thirds, and inasmuch as 
most spoiled ballot papers at the first ballot are probably involuntary, and 
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one can reasonably expect the proportion of involuntarily spoiled ballots to 
be the same at the second ballot as at the first, the increase must come 
exclusively from people who have deliberately spoiled their ballot papers. 
The increase in the proportion of spoiled ballots shows up in the Rosenthal- 
Sen analysis both because of its magnitude and the fact that it reflects 
unadulterated alienation. 
However, again on the basis of official returns, the proportion of absten- 
tions at the first ballot in districts where two ballots were required was 20.2 
percent at the first ballot and only 23.2 percent at the second ballot, for an 
increase of less than 15 percent. The number of abstainers just does not swell 
between the two ballots; the deliberate abstainers do not show up in aggre- 
gate data because they are heavily outnumbered by chronic and random 
abstainers. 
Of course, the ballot-spoilers who appear in our survey data are all delib- 
erate spoilers, while the spoilers who show up in the Rosenthal-Sen data 
include both deliberate spoilers and involuntary spoilers. But we have seen 
that the proportion of spoiled ballots increases sharply from the first to the 
second ballot, and we know from our survey that comparatively few people 
deliberately spoil their votes at the first ballot and that the overwhelming 
majority of people who deliberately spoil their votes at the second ballot are 
people who cannot repeat their first-ballot partisan voted The bulge in 
spoiled ballots that appears at the second ballot, therefore, comes almost 
exclusively from deliberate spoilers. This bulge registers directly in the Ro- 
senthal-Sen analysis. 
UNFRIENDLY NEIGHBORS 
Partisan preferences account for electoral participation at the second 
ballot in France; perceptions of left-right locations do not.l° In one sense, 
this finding may appear "obvious." It is a well-known historical phenome- 
non that the elites of ideologically related parties can generate more hostility 
toward each other than toward opponents who are more distant from them 
ideologically In France, this has been true particularly for Communist-So- 
cialist relations, but the phenomenon is not limited either to France or to the 
left. Heretics of various sorts have often been treated more harshly than 
nonbelievers. 
A similar phenomenon operates throughout the French mass electorate. 
French polling data regularly report that large proportions of first-ballot 
voters for noncommunist leftist parties refuse to vote for a Communist 
candidate at the second ballot, and that various proportions of non-Gaullist 
rightists, depending on the current political climate, refuse to vote for 
GattUists. This common knowledge, however, does not seem to have played 
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a cautionary role in considerations of the potential importance of the left- 
right dimension for electoral behavior. 
On the other hand, there is a counter-intuitive element to the finding. 
Even allowing for the existence of partisan hostilities among people with 
common left-right perceptions of themselves and the major parties, one 
could reasonably expect that across the electorate, partisan attitudes and 
left-right perceptions of party locations would correlate highly and that any 
phenomenon that could be accounted for by partisan sympathies would also 
be explicable in terms of left-right distances. In fact, the absolute differ- 
ences that French voters perceive between their own self-assigned left-right 
locations and those they assign to the various parties uniformly correlate in 
the expected direction with the amount of sympathy they feel for the same 
parties, and sometimes at levels that are quite respectable in social science 
research (r = .58 for the UNR; r = .56 for the PCF). 11 Yet our analysis 
provides no support for the notion that left-right perceptions account for 
electoral participation at the second ballot in France. 
There is simply too much variation in the attitudes of people toward 
particular parties--even though they perceive those parties to be close to 
one another in left-right terms--for left-right perceptions to count as much 
as partisan attitudes in decisions concerning electoral participation. There 
is a greater propensity for French voters to acknowledge that certain parties 
are ideologically related, through proximity on the left-right axis, than 
there is for the voters to have similar attitudes toward such neighboring 
parties. We can demonstrate this phenomenon by examining the intercorre- 
lations between sympathy scores for the main leftist parties or leaders (PCF, 
SFIO, Mitterrand), between sympathy scores for the main rightist parties or 
leaders (UNR, Giscard d'Estaing, Lecanuet), between left-right distances 
between self and the main leftist parties (PFC, SFIO, Federation), and 
between left-right distances between self and the main rightist parties 
(UNR, Independent Republicans, Democratic Center). The relevant corre- 
lation coefficients are set out in Table 4. 
The correlations for the left-right distance scores are uniformly stronger 
than the correlations for the sympathy scores for the equivalent matching 
pair of political objects. This tendency is somewhat more marked with 
regard to the leftwing parties than it is for the rightwing parties, but it 
occurs clearly for both types of party clusters. 
These figures mean that the voters come closer to regarding the main 
leftist parties (or the main rightist parties) as interchangeable in left-right 
terms than they do in terms of partisan sympathy. Across the electorate as a 
whole, French voters see less difference between the main leftist parties 
when they consider them in spatial left-right terms than they do when they 
consider them in terms of their rankings on the "feelings thermometer," and 
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TABLE 4. Zero-Order Correlations (r) Between Attitudes Toward Selected Pairs of 
Partisan Obieets (France, 1967). 
Left-Right Distance 







UNR (Gaullists)- .42 
Democratic Center 
Democratic Center- .55 
Independent Republicans 













the same holds true for the main right-wing parties. The voters simply 
distinguish more clearly between the major parties along the sympathy-hos- 
tility dimension than they do along the left-right dimension. Their decisions 
concerning electoral participation, therefore, are more sensitive to partisan 
attitudes than they are to sense of left-right distances. 
Even though our sample as a whole indicates that partisan feeling is a 
uniformly more powerful factor than sense of left-right distance in discrimi- 
nating between the major parties, we are particularly interested in the 
behavior of the subsets of voters who are most likely not to be able to repeat 
their first-ballot choice at the second ballot. Accordingly, we isolated three 
groups of first-ballot voters: those who voted for the Communist Party, 
those who voted for the noncommunist left (the Federation or the PSU), and 
those who voted for the Democratic Center. We ignored the people who 
voted for the UNR or the Independent Republicans, as those voters were 
seldom faced with having to choose a different candidate at the second 
ballot, as well as the voters for the smaller parties or for unaffiliated candi- 
dates, as they are comparatively few in numbers. 
For each of the three groups, we ran the same correlations that appear in 
Table 4. That operatiorl produced 18 matching pairs of correlations relating 
to partisan feelings on the one hand and to left-right distances on the other. 
Of those 18 matching pairs of correlations, those relating to left-right dis- 
tances were stronger than those relating to partisanship in 12 cases. In two 
cases the correlations were the same (after rounding to the second decimal). 
Only in four cases out of the 18 did the voters for one or the other of the three 
partisan groups involved distinguish more sharply between the main party 
clusters on the basis of left-right distances than by partisan sympathy. 
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The breakdown of the analysis by party groupings strengthens the argu- 
ment that electoral participation at the second ballot depends more on 
partisanship than on sense of left-right distance, because French voters 
distinguish more sharply between parties on grounds of partisanship than 
on grounds of left-right distance. More first-ballot voters who could not 
repeat their partisan choice at the second ballot had voted for the noncom- 
munist left than for any other partisan group (36 percent). Among Federa- 
tion or PSU voters, the tendency to regard ideologically related parties as 
unfriendly neighbors is clearly displayed. All six correlations are stronger on 
the left-right distance side than on the partisan sympathy side for the non- 
communist left. The historic rivalry between the two main branches of the 
marxist movement in Franee, the Socialist Party (SFIO) and the Commu- 
nist Party (PCF), is reflected in the partisan attitudes of the noncommunist 
left electorate, and so is the "new left" challenge of the PSU to both of those 
larger leftist parties. 
Centrists and Communists each supplied smaller proportions of forced- 
choice voters, but centrists displayed the unfriendly neighbors phenomenon 
almost as clearly as the noncommunist leftists did. Among Democratie Cen- 
ter voters, who furnished about a fourth of the voters who could not repeat 
their first-ballot choices at the second ballot, party sympathy discriminates 
more sharply among related parties than left-right distances do in five of the 
six matching pairs. 
Only first-ballot Communist voters, who also supplied a fourth of the 
forced-choice voters, failed to distinguish among the main parties more 
often by partisanship than by left-right distance. They did so only in one 
case out of the six. But neither did they behave in a directly contrary fashion. 
In three other cases, the Communist voters saw more difference among 
parties in left-right terms than in terms of partisan sympathy, but in two 
cases there was no difference in the strength of the two factors as a criterion 
of party difference. 
PARTISAN CHOICE 
In a work reporting the results of tests of various spatial models designed 
to account for French voters' partisan choices at the second ballot at all 
elections from 1958 to 1973 inclusively, once the voters decided to cast a 
valid vote, Rosenthal and Sen (1977, p. 1447) argue that "'the second ballot 
can be reasonably accounted for by a single Left-Right dimension." They do 
not test any other dimension. As in their earlier work (1973), they" employ 
aggregate data and apply the same conventions concerning uniform parti- 
san left-right locations and the location of partisan voters at the left-right 
position of the party for which they voted. 
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TABLE 5. Mean Partisan Sympathy and Mean Perceived Left-Right Distances for 
Party Chosen and Best Available Party Rejected in Forced-Choice Situations at the 
Seeond-Ballot (France, 1967). 
Mean Perceived 
Mean Left-Right Distance 
Sympathy of Party from Voter's 
Score Own Left-Right Location 
Party chosen 56.1 25.2 
(194) a (162) 
Best available party rejected 33.0 43.5 
(193) (154) 
aNumber of cases in parentheses (unweighted) 
On the basis of our 1967 survey data, we have made an independent test 
of what  accounts for the partisan choices of second-ballot voters in forced- 
choice situations, and our results confirm the Rosenthal-Sen (1977) finding 
that  they can be explained by perceptions of left-right distances. However, 
we also find that  partisan preferences provide a better explanation. Table 5 
presents the raw figures illustrating the operative power of both dimensions. 
There is a mean difference of almost 20 points in the expected direction 
between the relevant left-right scores, but there is also a mean difference of 
almost 25 points in the expected direction between the corresponding party 
sympathy scores. It is not possible from Table 5 alone to determine which of 
the two dimensional effects is the stronger, but a multiple regression pro- 
duces a partial eorrelation coefficient of r = .36 for net advantage in parti- 
san sympathy compared with a partial correlation coefficient of r = .29 for 
net advantage in left-right distance. 
We find, therefore, that  for first-ballot voters in forced-choice situations 
at the second ballot, partisan preferences account for both participation and 
electoral choices. Among the same set of voters, perceptions of left-right 
distances do not account for participation, but once the voter has decided to 
cast a valid ballot, they account for his partisan choice, although not quite 
as well as partisan preferences do. 
There is nothing contradictory in these findings with regard to left-right 
perceptions. Partisan preferences simply override left-right perceptions 
when the voter is deciding whether or not to cast a valid ballot. The voters 
who feel antagonistic toward the remaining choices, regardless of their 
left-right locations, spoil their ballots or deliberately abstain. Those with 
favorable attitudes toward at least one of the available choices remain in the 
active electorate. It is quite understandable that for those voters left-right 
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perceptions then come into play. They are the people whose left-right per- 
ceptions are not at odds with their partisan preferences. But even for the 
second-ballot voters, partisan sympathy outweighs left-right perceptions as 
a factor in partisan choice. 
DISCUSSION 
We have found that partisanship is a more important determinant of 
French electoral behavior at the second ballot than sense of left-right dis- 
tances. Partisan preferences eclipse perceived left-right party locations as a 
factor in the decision to vote, and while left-right perceptions affect the 
partisan choices of those people who do vote, those ehoiees are affected more 
strongly by partisan preferences. Left-right perceptions are related to, but 
cannot be equated with, partisan preferences. Whatever forces are at work 
among leftists who refuse to vote for certain parties they perceive as leftist, 
or among rightists who refuse to vote for some parties they perceive as 
rightists, are independent of the left-right dimension. 
One may argue that France is a special case because it alone among 
contemporary democracies employs a two-ballot electoral system, and that 
the relative weakness of the left-right dimension as a factor in French sec- 
ond-ballot electoral behavior is largely irrelevant for countries with single- 
ballot electoral systems, particularly where most of the parties run candi- 
dates in most of the districts most of the time, thereby enlarging 
opportunities for the electorate to vote for their preferred parties. 
But far from being irrelevant for other systems, the French findings have 
direct implications for them, for those findings run counter to the notion 
that left-right perceptions underlie partisan attitudes. The keen interest in 
the left-right dimension did not develop simply because scholars thought 
that it might be one dimension among others that help the voters organize 
political information and orient their political behavior. It derived from the 
possibility that the left-right dimension might turn out to be the dimension 
that provided the foundation for the others, at least in certain countries, 
among which France appears to be archetypal. 
It is exeeedingly difficult, however, to establish causal priority among 
such variables as left-right perceptions and partisan attachments. We have 
reported them to be correlated comparatively highly with each other in one 
form, and Inglehart and Klingemann (1976, p. 256) show them generally to 
be highly intercorrelated in another form. ~Ve may, however, reasonably 
doubt that left-right perceptions generally underlie partisan attachments in 
a causal sense when we find that in France electoral partieipation depends 
on the latter but not on the former. 
This is not to say that the left-right dimension is unimportant or unworthy 
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o r  o u r  a t t e n t i o n .  O n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e  e v i d e n c e  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
e f f e c t s  o f  l e f t - r i g h t  p e r c e p t i o n s  a n d  p a r t i s a n  a t t i t u d e s  is f a r  f r o m  c o m p l e t e ,  
t o  s a y  n o t h i n g  a b o u t  t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  h o w  t h e s e  t w o  p h e n o m e n a  o r i g i n a t e  
a n d  i n t e r a c t  w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r ,  I n d e e d ,  t h e  e v i d e n c e  w e  h a v e  e x a m i n e d  sug -  
ges t s  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h o s e  t w o  f a c t o r s  m a y  b e  q u i t e  c o m p l e x .  
Al l  w e  w i s h  t o  c l a i m  h e r e  is t h a t  w e  see  n o  r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  l e f t - r i g h t  
p e r c e p t i o n s  g e n e r a l l y  o u t w e i g h  p a r t i s a n  a t t i t u d e s  as  a d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  e l ec -  
t o r a l  b e h a v i o r .  
NOTES 
I. Members of the French National Assembly are elected at the first ballot only if they win a 
majority of the valid ballots cast in their districts, and their total vote amounts to at least a 
fourth of the registered voters. Otherwise, there is a second ballot, at which a plurality 
suffices for election. Most seats are decided only at the second ballot. 
In almost every" district, there are fewer candidates at the second ballot than there were 
at the first. Candidates who do not receive a certain proportion of the first-ballot votes are 
automatically eliminated from the second. Other candidates who are eligible to run at the 
second ballot choose to withdraw from the race. 
This system places different groups of voters in different situations. Voters where the 
election is decided at the first ballot vote only once. Voters where there is a second ballot 
may vote a second time, but their situations differ depending on whether or not the 
candidate for whom they voted at the first ballot also runs at the second. Voters whose 
first-ballot choices run at the second ballot may simply repeat their partisan vote. Voters 
whose preferred candidates drop out of the race, however, faee a new situation and have 
three alternatives: they may vote for another candidate, abstain, or register a protest 
against the foreed-choiee situation by deliberately spoiling their ballots. These voters con- 
stitute a critical group for the study of electoral participation, as they permit us to compare 
the behavior of the same voters under different conditions. 
Readers whose primary interest lies in U.S. elections may be surprised by the importance 
we attribute here to spoiled (invalid) ballots, as the United States is perhaps the only 
democratic country where invalid ballots are not customarily recorded in election statis- 
tics. Voters may spoil their ballots, either involuntarily or deliberately, and we will be 
concerned with deliberate ballot-spoiling. For the proportions of invalid ballots at national 
elections in various countries, see Maekie and Rose (1974); for a specialized discussion and 
general bibliography, see Stiefbold (1965). 
2. This model is outside the frame of referenee of this article and will be discussed elsewhere. 
3. To determine whether the left-right distances test was contaminated by the inclusion of the 
marais, people who classify themselves at 50 on the left-right scale but who have so little 
interest in polities that  there is virtually no political meaning associated with their self-clas- 
sification, we reran the test excluding the marais, but the results were basically unchanged. 
On the marais, see Deutsch, Lindon, and Weill (1966). 
4. Because the N's are small for some of our test groups, we have reported the significance 
levels of the differences in means between the two smallest groups compared in Table 3. 
5. A word is in order about the construction of Table 3. Direct party sympathy scores were 
applied for the PCF, PSU, and UNR. We had no party sympathy measures for the Indepen- 
dent Republicans and the Democratic Center, but we did have sympathy scores for VaI&y 
Giseard d'Estaing and for Jean Lecanuet, the respective leaders of those two form ations, so 
those scores were plugged in where applicable. We had no Federation or Convention 
sympathy scores, but we did have scores for the SFIO, the Radicals, and Fran¢ois Mitter- 
rand. Accordingly, where the Federation candidate was SFIO, we searched for the SFIO 
sympathy score, but if there was none we applied the sympathy score for Mitterrand. 
Where the Federation candidate was a Radical, we searched for the Radical sympathy 
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score but if there was none, we used the score for Mitterrand. For straight Federation 
candidates and Federation candidates from the Convention, we used the sympathy score 
for Mitterrand. For Alliance R~publicaine candidates, as well as all other rightwing candi- 
dates outside the major parties already mentioned, we plugged in the sympathy score for 
Jean Louis Tixier-Vignancour. 
Naturally, we would prefer to have direct party sympathy measures in every case, but we 
do not believe the resort to "functional equivalents" is a serious source of error here. The 
sympathy scores, for which we employ mixed objects, give us positive results, while the 
left-right distances, for which we have direct measures, do not. 
6. It would be more satisfying if the spoilers liked the best available parties even less than the 
deliberate abstainers did. After all, it takes more effort to spoil a ballot than to abstain, and 
it would be reasonable to expect the spoilers to be more hostile to the available choices than 
the abstainers are. On our measures, however, the opposite is the case. 
7. When we make a similar sorting between deliberate and random abstainers and generate 
the relevant scores pertaining to left-right perceptions, as reported in the upper-left portion 
of Table 1, we find support for the notion that perceived left-right distances account for the 
behavior of the deliberate abstainers. We are down to an N of 7 in that subgroup, however, 
and we cannot generalize from this limited finding when the larger group of ballot-spoilers 
does not also appear to be acting on the basis of left-right perceptions. 
8, On a five-item scale of political involvement, the random abstainers among the first-ballot 
voters who could not repeat their choice at the second ballot have a mean standardized 
score of. 05, while the first-ballot voters who could repeat their first-ballot choice but who 
abstained at the second ballot have a mean standardized score of - .09 .  Both groups of 
abstainers are, therefore, relatively close to the sample mean. For first-ballot voters who 
could not repeat their choice and who spoiled their ballots, the corresponding mean score is 
• 69; for voters in forced-choice situations who voted for another candidate, it is .54; and for 
the deliberate abstainers among those who could not repeat their partisan choice, the score 
is .53. Deliberate abstainers are not quite as strongly involved politically as spoilers, which 
may account for why they merely abstained rather than take the trouble to spoil their 
ballots. Chronic abstainers, the people who did not bother to vote at either the first or the 
second ballot, have a mean standardized involvement score of -1 .38.  
9. In the 76 districts of our sample where there was a second ballot, only one percent of the 
voters reported having spoiled their votes at the first ballot, compared with 3.4 percent 
who reported spoiling them at the second ballot. 
10. There is some irony in the difference between our results and those of Rosenthal and Sen 
(1973) on this score, as the left-right locations that they assign to the French parties derive 
from the 1967 survey on which our work is based. The party preference data that they 
employ are based on estimates Philip E. Converse (1966) produced by a Coombsian unfold- 
ing analysis of 1958 French survey data. The left-right locations that they use are based on 
the mean locations of the French parties as perceived by the respondents in our 1967 survey, 
and reported in Barnes and Pierce (1971). Their findings and ours agree with respect to 
partisan preferences, although they use 1958 data derived in one fashion and we use 1967 
data derived in another way, while their findings and ours differ concerning left-right 
perceptions, even though their work and ours ultimately rest on the same set of empirical 
data. 
11. The correlations are literally negative, as the smaller the left-right distance between the 
voter and the party, the greater the voter's sympathy for the party. 
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